Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Similarity: Similarity is the conformity of one or more - but not all - properties of two or more objects. See also Identity, Equality, Properties, Predicates, Predication, Identification, Descriptions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Ullin Thomas Place on Similarity - Dictionary of Arguments
Armstrong II (b) 34/35 Exact Similarity/Armstrong: allows formation of equivalence classes (instead of universals). Nominalism (Place): then similar property (as particulars) means all exactly similar properties. Universals (Armstrong): many particulars with the same properties. Universal-realist: takes for each class exactly one universal. - - - Martin I 72 Similarity/equality/property/Martin: Thesis: We need to rethink the ordinary exact and inexact equality between objects (these need a way, in relation to which they may be the same). Instead: similarity between properties. - - - Armstrong II (c) 97f Similarity: NominalismVsArmstrong: must assume the instantiation of various universals for every similarity which is not exact! >Multiplication of entities. MartinVsArmstrong: similarity is ontologically the fundamental concept._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
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> Counter arguments against Place
> Counter arguments in relation to Similarity
